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ABSTRACT
Changes in tax policy can affect all aspects of the economy.  Not only do firms and individuals
change behavior, creating efficiency costs, but government expenditure choices can also change.  Unless
these expenditure choices had been ``optimal'' previously, changes in response to a tax reform affect
welfare and should be taken into account when designing tax policy.
This paper develops a specific model of government behavior and then explores the implications
of government, as well as private, behavioral responses for tax policy.  In particular, we assume that
government officials favor expenditure (or regulatory) choices that increase the government's budget.  As
a result, higher tax rates on a particular activity encourage government behavior that aids the growth of this
activity.  This response enables tax policy to redirect government activity in desirable directions, but it also
makes Pigovian taxes on negative externalities less effective.
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rgordon@umich.edu It is well understood that taxes distort the incentives faced by individuals when they mke
economic decisions. In fact, the resulting efficiency costs have become the central focus in any
discussion of optimal tax policy. By now, there is a huge literature measuring the efficiency
costs of tax distortions, particularly those affecting labor supply, savings and investment
behavior, and corporate financial policy. Discussions of the efficiency implications of tax
policy have focused almost exclusively, however, on distortions to the behavior of private
individuals and firms, ignoring any implications of taxes for the behavior of government
officials. Why?
It is certainly hard to argue that taxes have no effects on the behavior of the government.
All aspects of the economy can change in response to the choice of a tax structure —gov-
ernment behavior is no exception. The implicit assumption in any discussion of tax policy is
that government expenditure and regulatory choices have been "optimal," based on whatever
measure of welfare is chosen. If so, then any changes in government behavior in response to
a change in tax structure have no welfare implications at the margin.
Regardless of one's political views, however, it is hard to make a credible case that govern-
ment allocation decisions have been "optimal." Government decisions are made by individu-
als, acting as agents for the rest of us, agents who presumably act in their own self—interest.
Of course, residents will do their best to design the incentives faced by government officials
to induce then to act in the "public interest." But, as with any principal—agent problem. the
potential success of such an incentive contract is limited.
Designing an incentive contract for government officials is much harder than doing so
for corporate managers. To begin with, officials inevitably have their own idiosyncratic
preferences over government policies, so that the incentive problem is not simply to induce
sufficient effort. The threat to fire an official for poor performance is also less effective that
for a corporate manager. The opportunities for voters to fire officials are very restricted, since
elections occur infrequently and at dates outside the control of voters. In addition. voters are
likely to be much more poorly informed than corporate Boards of Directors, since each voter
has much less at stake than the typical Director and fewer sources of information. The cost
to the official of being fired is also unclear, since officials can apparently earn much more from
jobs in the private sector than they do in their government positions. In fact, voters often
foreclose this option in the case of nonelected officials by setting up civil service protection,
preventing officials from being fired. In any case, the principal can face substantial costs of
finding a replacement, and has no assurance that the replacement will perform any better
than the previous official.1
'Promotions may be a somewhat more effective means of providing incentives. However, there is no obvious
1If as a result, government officials face weak incentives to act in the publicinterest. then
there can be no presumption that the a.Uocation choices they make are "optimal," regardless
of the criteria used. As a result, if their allocation choices change in response to a change in
the tax structure, then the welfare implications of the resulting changes in allocations should
be taken into account when measuring the overall welfare consequences of any tax change.
Similarly, when designing an "optimal" tax structure, the efficiency implications of changes
in government as well as private behavior should be taken into account.
The key problem in pursuing this argument is that we have no clear model for how
government allocation decisions are affected by the choice of tax structure. One simple
approach would be to allow the median voter to determine each expenditure decision in
sequence, based on the utility gains from the extra expenditures net of the utility losses from
that voter's share of the resulting extra taxes. A redesign of the tax structure would then
affect the pattern of net gains and losses within the population, changing both the identity of
the median voter and his/her preferred level of expenditures on each type of public activity.
Only with a benefit tax for each type of expenditure can there be an assurance that the
resulting expenditure decisions will be efficient.
Expenditures and regulatory policies are rarely chosen directly by the voters, however.
Even the legislature typically chooses only the overall level of expenditures on broad categories
of government activity, delegating the specific expenditure choices to government bureaucrats.
Specific choices normally require not only detailed information about the range of options
available, but also substantial expertise in order to judge their consequences. Neither the
public nor the legislature would be in a position to make these decisions, nor are they in
a good position to judge ex post whether the right decisions were made.2 Any contracts
linking the pay of bureaucrats to specific measures of performance are therefore unlikely to
be effective. They are also very rare in practice.
What then determines the behavior of bureaucrats? Here, models need to be more spec-
ulative. Personal preferences on policy, pressures of various sorts from affected parties (legal
and illegal), as well as financial incentives can all matter. Since contractual links between
pay and performance are rarely present, any financial incentives are mostly indirect, through
implications for the bureau's budget.3 While Niskanen (1971) assumed that budgets are af-
representative of the residents who is in a position to and has the incentives to make these promotion decisions
in the interests of the population. For corporations, in contrast, the Board of Directors are in a position to.
and because of their large shareholdings, have a strong incentive to act in the interests of shareholders.
2Even if they had the expertise, the bureaucrats normally control the relevant sources of information.
3The means by which an individual can benefit from a higher budget are many: fancier offices, free meals
and travel, jobs for friends and relatives, or even a higher salary to compensate for the added responsibility
of overseeing a larger budget.
2fected through a particular form of negotiation between the bureaucracy and te legislature.
our starting point is the presumption that a key determinant of the budget to any bureu-
cratic group is the overall amount of tax revenue available to the government,e.g. a given
percent increase in the overall budget results in approximately the same percent increase in
each bureau's budget.4
The first purpose of this paper is to explore how this assumed link between the tax
structure and each bureau's budget can affect the policy choices made by these officials.
Since the tax structure itself is set by the legislature, the only way that policy choices can
affect the government's budget is through effects on the tax base. Policies that increase the
tax base then become more attractive, everything else equal, and conversely.
What incentives this creates depends heavily on the nature of the tax structure. The
observation that first stimulated us to pursue this model was the rapid growth and dynamic
behavior of the nonstate sector in China. Nonstate firms have faced such high tax rates that
private investment incentives should have been minimal. However, their tax payments went
primarily to the local government, giving local government officials a strong personal interest
in encouraging the growth of this tax base. The support and subsidies provided by these
officials have in practice been sufficient to generate the observed rapid growth. in spite of the
weak private incentives.
In contrast, governments in many poorer countries (including some of the other transition
countries) rely heavily on profits taxes on large (often state—owned) manufacturing firms for
their revenue. Given this tax structure, the government has a financial incentive to pursue
policies that increase profits of these large firms, whether at the expense of small firms.
workers, or consumers. Stories of the resulting protection of these large firms, and harassment
of competing smaller firms (if only through endless red tape), are legion.
Similarly, high tax rates on cigarette consumption or pollution emissions generate a per-
verse incentive on the part of government officials to encourage cigarette consumption and
pollution emissions so as to increase their budget, in this case directly contrary to the intent
of the policy. Whether a high cigarette tax then reduces cigarette consumption on net de-
pends on the offsetting effects of the higher price vs. the more lenient regulatory restrictions
that the government would adopt in response to the greater dependence of its tax revenue
on cigarette consumption.
The most familiar example of officials responding to financial incentives is probably the
use of "speed traps." Local officials certainly have the financial incentive to set up restrictive
4This link becomes stronger if some sources of revenue are earmarked for particular uses. e.g. highway tolls
are earmarked for road maintenance and construction.
3traffic regulations and then strictly enforce them, in order to gain the additionarrevenue from
fines. In this case, financial incentives may be too strong from a social perspective, though
perhaps not from the local community's perspective, given that many of the fines are paid
by nonresidents.
The government can find it very costly to ignore the incentives created by the tax struc-
ture. For example, when Gorbachev tried to reduce alcohol production in order to reduce
drunkenness and so improve productivity, one perhaps unintended consequence was a sharp
drop in government revenue. Tax rates on alcohol consumption had been very high, and the
drop in consumption brought on by Gorbachev's policy initiative generated a large budget
deficit, followed by rapid inflation. The resulting macroeconomic problems were an important
factor in the unraveling of the Soviet Union.
Any study of optimal tax policy should then take into account these potential effects
of the tax structure on government behavior, as well as effects on private behavior. The
efficiency costs of tax distortions to private behavior are normally of second—order importance.
given that any small deviations from an efficient allocation have no welfare costs at the
margin. Since government behavior is inevitably not optimal, however, the efficiency effects
of marginal changes from the behavior that would occur ignoring tax incentives can well
be large, so in principle could be a dominant consideration in the design of tax policy. In
fact, the changes in government behavior induced by the tax structure can well be efficiency
enhancing, making a distorting tax structure attractive even if the government is concerned
only with maximizing efficiency.
In section 1, we explore the implications of induced changes in government behavior for
tax policy in a simple example, in order to clarify the intuition. In this example, the behavior
of government officials is short-sighted. Given their limited time in office, they have too weak
an incentive to support longer-term investments. We find that taxing the return to longer-
term investments can be justified to compensate for this underlying bias in the behavior of
officials.
Section 2 then explores a more general model of optimal taxation, taking into account the
resulting effects on government as well as private behavior. The implications more broadly
for tax policy are discussed in section 3.
1 Initial Example —ShortJob Tenure
Government expenditure decisions can be inefficient for many reasons. One commonly cited
reason is that officials have a short job tenure. It is commonly argued that short job tenure
4generates short—sighted behavior on the part of officials. Local public officis, for exam-
ple, commonly seem to invest too little in maintenance activities, infrastructure, and otlier
activities having a longer-term payoff.
In principle, voters should recognize the benefits of both longer-term and shorter-term
investments, and take both into account when choosing candidates. If electoral pressures
are the sole determinant of the incentives faced by officials, then such short-sighted behavior
would be puzzling.
Perhaps voters are poorly informed or themselves myopic. Our hypothesis instead is that
this short-sighted behavior results from the implicit incentives created by the tax structure.
Officials benefit from being in office in part by receiving personal benefits tied to the tax
revenue collected while they are in office. If longer-term investments, in contrast to other
expenditures. generate tax revenues more heavily in the future, then they become less at-
tractive.
To be concrete, consider a two period model in which the representative resident has an
objective function U + H(G), where
Uu(Ci)+. (1)
Here, 6 is the utility discount rate, C is real consumption at date t, and C equals the
present value of government expenditures. Savings can be divided between investments in
domestic firms, where an investment of I yields f(I) in the second period, and investments
in the international bond market. where the rate of return is r.5 The individual faces a
consumption tax at rate r and a tax at rate t on the amount invested in domestic firms. As
a result, he makes decisions subject to the following budget constraints
(1+r)Ci+(1+t)I+B=Y (2)
(1+r)C2 =f(I)+B(1+r), (3)
where Y is initial income and B is the amount invested in the international bond market.
Ignoring effects of taxes on government behavior, the optimal tax structure would set
t =0and raise revenue solely with the consumption tax. Given our assumption that Y is
5For simplicity, assume that the country is a price-taker on the world capital market.
5exogenous. a consumption tax is equivalent to a lump-sum tax, whereas t distorts saviflgs
decisions.
What effect does the tax structure have on government behavior? Assume that the
objective function of the government official is to maximize a weighted sum of the utility of
the representative resident and the official's personal income. The official's personal income
equals the discounted sum of her yearly salary S while in office, some fraction 0 of the tax
revenue she oversee while she serves as an official,6 plus her outside income flifshe is no
longer in office. We can therefore express her objective function as
L A(U + H) + S+ 9(rC1 + tI)+(S + 8rC2)±(1 —)Yfl
(4)
Here, A is the exogenous weight put on the utility of the representative individual, ir is the
exogenous probability that the official remains in office in period 2. and r is the market
interest rate.
For simplicity, assume that the present value of government revenue, net of the fraction
6 kept by the official, must be spent on G. so that
G=(1-9) (rci+tI+ ).
(5)
In addition, however, assume that the official controls a set of regulations, e.g. zoning re-
strictions. that can limit the amount of investment I. The equilibrium level of investment is
therefore the minimum of what the representative individual would choose. and the amount
preferred by the government official.
The individual would choose to invest until f' =(1+ r)(1 + t). What level of I would
the official prefer? Differentiating her objective function with respect to I, and using the
individual's budget constraints to determine the resulting changes in C1 and C2, we find that
8LIOU OH'\ r(1+t) itrf' —=A(—-—+(1—9)t-—--i+Ot— + =0. (6) OGj 1+r1+rl+i-
Clearly, the outcome depends on the tax structure. If the legislature were to choose the
tax structure to maximize the utility of the representative individual, what tax rates would
it choose? As t increases, the value of I preferred by the representative individual falls.
However, the value preferred by the government official increases. Since the equilibrium
value is the minimum of the two, investment is maximized when the two are equal. Since
6For the moment, we treat 9 as exogenous. This assumption is relaxed in section 2.
6even this value is below the efficient value, the second-best optimal tax structure is the one
that equates the value of I preferred by the representative individual with that preferred by
the official. When the two coincide, auai =0and f' =(1--r)(1+ t). Substituting these




In particular, if ir =1then capital income should not be taxed. In this case, the representative
consumer and the official put the same relative weights on consumption in the two periods
even without such a tax, so no further correction is needed.
In contrast, if r =0,so that the official is in office for just one period, then new investment
must be taxed at some positive rate t, 0 < tr, to induce the official to support the efficient
amount of new investment.7 This is equivalent to imposing a comprehensive income tax
at rate t/(1 + t) in combination with a consumption tax at rate i-— t.To see this, note
that consumption plus investment equals labor income plus capital income by an accounting
identity. A uniform tax rate on C + I at rate t is equivalent to a tax at a uniform rate on
comprehensive (labor plus capital) income, at a rate t/(1 + t).
For intermediate values of r, the optimal tax structure would use a consumption tax more
heavily, but still have some use of a comprehensive income tax. The short time horizon of
government officials therefore has clear effects on the optimal tax structure. If there were no
agency problems. the optimal tax would be a consumption tax. whereas with agency problems
it is a weighted average of a consumption tax and a comprehensive income tax.
2 General Implications of Agency Problems for Optimal Taxes
This initial model suppressed a number of important considerations. To begin with, it treated
the probability of leaving office as exogenous. Yet voters would attempt to vote elected
officials out of office if they are performing poorly. Similarly, they would design employment
terms for bureaucrats so that they also lose office (or at least fail to be promoted) if they
perform poorly.
To capture this consideration, assume that the probability r that the official keeps her
job is a function of the utility of the representative resident, U, giving ir(U)withir' ￿ 0. We
also assume that ir is concave in U.
The initial model also assumed that the fraction of the budget, 6, received by the official
71f A =0,so that the official does not care about the utility of the resident, then =
7is exogenous. Instead, we will now allow the official to choose the residual amo.int R to keep
for herself, recognizing that a higher R will reduce her chances of remaining in office.
In designing incentives for the official, residents face two related problems. First, they
would like to control the total compensation of the official, even though the official has control
over R. This problem should be relatively easy to deal with. The total compensation of the
official is R plus the stated salary S. As long as R is kept below the total desired compensation
through the threat of job loss, then S can be set equal to the total intended compensation
minus the expected value of R.8 Of course, as in the efficiency wage models, the total desired
compensation needs to be high, so that the threat of job loss matters to the official.9
The main problem faced in designing incentives is that in general the official will have dif-
ferent preferences than the representative agent regarding the optimal composition of public
expenditures. For example, given the high skills commonly required by government admin-
istrative jobs, officials will have higher skills (and higher incomes) than the representative
resident. They will therefore have a bias towards public goods preferred by high income
individuals.10
The final modeling issue is the range of tools available to the representative resident when
designing the incentives faced by government officials. In particular, to what degree can they
make the official's salary contingent on performance? Such contractual links are rare, by our
reading of the evidence. One explanation may be that residents cannot directly monitor the
salary setting process for officials, and so would need to rely on some agent to oversee any
link between salary and performance." Yet the incentives of any agent to act in the interests
of residents are weak, leaving residents vulnerable to collusion between the agent and the
officials whose salaries he is overseeing. This risk of corruption seems to be sufficient that
residents commonly impose very tight restrictions on the salary structure of officials, in an
attempt to eliminate corruption but in the process also eliminating any links between pay
and performance. Given the lack of observed links, we simply assume that the salary S of
the official is set before performance is observed. Our model does tie financial incentives to
the utility of residents indirectly, though, through the dependence of the probability of the
8Added complications arise when R exceeds the total desired compensation, driving S to zero. In some
developing countries, government salaries indeed are effectively zero, even relative to salaries elsewhere in the
economy. This outcome is not seen in more developed economies, however, so we will not focus on it.
9See, for example, Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) for further discussion.
'°Another reason for differing preferences is the effects of bribes from various lobbying groups. We will not
deal with bribery explicitly, instead allowing them to be captured implicitly through the particular form of
the official's preferences.
"In contrast, residents can much more easily monitor the design of the tax structure, either requiring a
referendum to approve a new tax structure or at least penalizing agents who act against their wishes.
8official being fired on the utility of the resident.
The remaining setup of the model is quite conventional. Let the per period utility of
the representative resident equal U(q, g, —T), where q is the vector of goods prices, g is the
vector of public goods, and T is a lump—sum tax paid to the government. Also, denote this
individual's net demand/supply of goods by x(q, g, T).
If the vector of total private outputs equals y, then y is feasible as long as F(y, g) ￿ 0, for
any given vector of public goods g. For simplicity, we assume that this production function
has constant returns to scale with respect to the vector y. Public expenditures potentially
raise productivity, however, perhaps differently for different goods. Given competitive factor
and output markets, we can express the equilibrium prices faced by firms as a function p(y. g).
To simplify the initial derivations, however, assume that the p are constant, due to a linear
technology that is unaffected by g. Later we will note what changes when g and y affect p.
To fix the price level, let P1 =1.
The assumed tax structure consists of the lump-sum tax T along with a vector of com-
modity tax rates t. Consumer/factor prices therefore satisfy q, =(1+ t,)p.
Let the utility of the government official while in office equal V(p, g. R, S).'2 If the official
is not in office, however, let her utility instead equal some exogenous value V.'3
Here, we allow incomes R and S to enter the official's utility separately. While we do
not make r an explicit function of R, we assume implicitly that the official must go to some
effort to disguise R in order to minimize the risks of problems. As a result, R is not normally
taken as cash but instead as in-kind benefits. e.g., "perks." We assume that perks are a less
efficient way to obtain utility, because the form in which they can be consumed is restricted
in order to keep them disguised. The assumed inefficiency of "perks" is represented by the
assumption that V ￿ VR at all positive S and R (and all possible values of p and g). with
equality only when R =0.14In addition, we assume that VS/VR increases as perks rise and
salary falls.
Implicitly, the model is intended to describe a dynamic process, in which job loss poten-
tially occurs at some point in the future, depending on current job performance. To maintain
a one-period model, however, we assume that the official faces a probability 1 —rof losing
'2While the official pays q directly, when buying goods, the taxes paid are then available to the official as
part of the government budget. As a result, we choose to simplify here by assuming that the official simply
faces the pretax prices p when buying goods.
can well be affected by government policies. However, we assume that the policies that are implemented
if the official is replaced are unaffected by the policies that had previously been proposed by the official.
'4Even without agency problems, of course, "perks" are nonzero, simply because people want a comfortable
life on as well as off the job. Here, we define "perks" as noncash compensation above the amount that would
occur without agency problems.
9her job immediately upon announcing her planned expenditure package, so 'ends up with
expected utility W equal to
W=irV(p,g.R,S)+(1—ir)V" (8)
For simplicity, assume that the public goods g are produced using the numeraire good as
the sole input, with constant returns to scale. Any one public good 9jhasa marginal (and
average) cost equal to ci.Totalcosts of public good production therefore equal c'g.
Thebudget constraint faced by the official equals
tpx2+T=c'g+S+R (9)
The official chooses g and R, subject to the budget constraint (9) to maximize her utility.
given S, T, and t. Facing this behavioral response of the official, the representative resident
then chooses S. T, and t to maximize social welfare. Including the utility of both the official
and the resident, social welfare is measured by U + W. In analyzing this problem, we start
by examining the behavior of the official, and then explore the implications for the optimal
tax structure.
2.1Allocation decisions of the bureaucrat
The official chooses g to maximize her utility, W, conditional on the behavioral responses of
the representative resident, conditional on S, T, and t, and subject to the budget constraint
(9).
Samuelson (1954) showed that the supplies of public goods are optimal, if they are financed
with lump—sum taxes and the distribution of income is optimal. when
MRS' + MRS =MRT, (10)
i.e. if the sum of the relative marginal benefits to both the government official (MRS') and
the resident (MRS) of additional gj vs. additional private goods equals the relative marginal
costs, MRT.15 Lump—sum taxes are available in our model, so that ignoring agency problems
an analogous condition should hold in our setting as well. Instead, because of the agency
'5Since the overall population is large relative to the number of officials, we assume that MRS >>MRS,
capturing the population weights implicitly.





where MRS =[oV/agJ/Vs,MRS =[8U/8g]/U1,MRT =andUj =—t9U/ÔT.
Clearly equation (11) in general is very different than equation (10), implying that agency
problems have important effects on the pattern of expenditures. To clarify the sources of the
differences, assume that U1 =V5,so that the income distribution is optimal as assumed
by Samuelson. If, in addition, only lump—sum taxes are used, then at least the right-hand
sides of the two equations are the same. In general, though, the left-hand sides remain very
different. Note that the official takes into account the marginal benefits to the resident only to
the extent that ir'(V —V)/ir> 0. This requires that officials be provided higher utility than
they can receive elsewhere. The implied extra payments to officials, to induce them to take
into account the preferences of residents, result from the agency problems that Samuelson
assumed away. These extra payments by residents to officials reduce social welfare below the
first-best level, even if the incentives they create lead to efficient behavior.
The presumption in our analysis, however, is that the threat of job loss is insufficient in
itself to induce the official to give adequate weight to the preferences of the residents. This
presumption implies that 7r'(V —V)/ir <1. Therefore, what is spent will be allocated too
heavily towards those goods preferred by the official. In addition, ignoring the term VS/VR.
too little is spent on public goods. (In principle, however, VS/VR could be high enough to
offset this bias towards too little public spending.)
2.2 Optimal tax policy
How then do agency problems affect the optimal tax structure? In the above model. ignoring
agency problems only lump-sum taxes would be used. The level of the tax would be set
so that equation (10) holds, so that the sum across people of the relative marginal value of
public vs. private goods equals the relative marginal costs.
With agency problems, in contrast, distorting taxes may well serve as a second-best
device to induce the bureaucrat to supply both more and a better composition of public
goods. Consider, for example, an increase in some tax rate tk and a compensating fall in
the lump—sum tax rate T, starting from the optimal policies, chosen to leave tax revenue
unaffected, given existing values of g. With tax revenue unaffected, the utility of the official
11is also unaffected.'6 At the optimum, therefore, the utility of the resident STiould also be
unaffected at the margin.
Holding the supplies of public goods fixed, the resident is made worse off due to the
greater reliance on distorting taxes. The resident's welfare can remain unchanged, therefore.
only if supplies of public goods improve by enough to compensate.
More formally, the change in welfare from this tax change, starting from the optimal
policies, must equal zero. Differentiating the sum of utilities of the official and the resident
with respect to the combined tax changes, we infer that
=0. (12)
where dx1 is the change in demand for x brought about by the combined changes in tk.T.
and g. and where dg is the change in the supply of g induced by this change in tax policy.
If the dg are all zero, then this equation can hold only when t =0,i.e. without agency
problems only lump—sum taxes will be used.
What can we say about how this shift in tax policy will affect the official's choice for g.
as determined by equation (11)? Since U is unaffected at the margin. r remains unchanged.
Also, V does not change at the margin, given that the officials budget is fixed. If g were to
remain unchanged, then V5, VR. and all remain unchanged, though MRS may change
due to compensated cross-price effects. The key change. however, is the increase in tk on
the right-hand side of the equation. This increase makes supplying public goods that are
complements (substitutes) to xk more (less) attractive, since the resulting changes in 1know
have larger effects on tax revenue.
To the extent that a higher skilled official undersupplies those public goods preferred
by the lower skilled residents, distorting taxes can be used to offset this bias.17 Assume.
for example, that certain taxable private consumption expenditures of particular individuals
can substitute for public goods, e.g., private schools substitute for public schools, or private
expenditures on security alarms substitute for better police protection. Then taxes on the
substitute goods purchased by high income individuals, and subsidies on the substitute goods
purchased by poorer individuals, can offset the inherent bias officials would otherwise have
towards favoring the public goods benefiting high income individuals. That is, extra expen-
16The official's choice for g certainly changes, but by the envelope theorem marginal changes in g have no
effect on utility.
17Given the efficiency costs of using distorting taxes to offset the unrepresentative tastes of a higher skilled
official. another alternative would be to employ somewhat lower skilled officials than would otherwise be
optimal.
12ditures on public goods that benefit high income individuals would result in a drop inprivte
expenditures on the goods they find a close substitute, resulting in a drop in tax revenue.
Conversely, extra expenditures on the goods favored by lower income individuals would result
in less spent on subsidies to the substitute goods these individuals would otherwise purchase.
Taxes can also be used simply to strengthen incentives to provide public goods,e.g. taxing
automobiles or gasoline usage encourages investments in road improvements, and higher or
more progressive tax rates on labor income encourage more expenditures on education.
As long as distorting taxes induce at least some favorable change in the supply of public
goods, then they should be used, at least to some extent. In particular, if the second term in
equation (12) is positive, then distorting taxes will be increased to replace lump—sum taxes
until the first term is negative enough to offset the second term.
Similarly, the first—order condition for the optimal salary for the public official. holding
T and t fixed, equals
(Vs —VR)+ dg, =0. (13)
•93
where once again the envelope theorem allows us to hold g fixed when calculating the first-
order change in V. Everything else equal, it is better to pay the official through cash rather
than through perks, given that the official values cash more highly. In equilibrium, however.
this benefit will be just offset by a resulting deterioration in the level and/or composition of
public goods supplies, as viewed from the perspective of the resident. In particular. the rise
in the utility of the official just offsets the resulting fall in the utility of the resident.
What can we learn from equation (11) about the effect of a change in the form of com-
pensation on g? The key way that this change in compensation shows up in equation (11)
is in the ratio VS/VR. By assumption, this ratio falls if the official is no longer forced to
concentrate her consumption so much in "perks." Since "perks" are now more highly valued
at the margin, public goods expenditures as a whole become less attractive. However, the
official will put more weight on the preferences of the resident when choosing the composi-
tion of public goods, since the rise in V and the fall in U imply that ir'(V —VT1)/irrises.
En equilibrium, the fall in the overall level must more than offset any improvement in the
composition of expenditures.
Finally, consider the effects of a marginal increase in the lump—sum tax rate. The resulting




Here, the first term is negative under our assumption that U1V5 > VR. There is a
strong presumption that the second term is negative when the taxes are levied on the goods
consumed by the resident, since an additional lump-sum tax causes consumption to fall on
net.19 Therefore, lump-sum taxes should be increased only if these costs are offset by a
sufficient improvement in the level and/or composition of public goods supplies, as judged
from the perspective of the resident.
Close inspection of equation (11) shows that an increase in T should improve both the
level and the composition of public goods. The only alternative to spending the extra money
on public goods is to raise R. This causes VS/VR to rise, making it attractive to spend at
least some of the extra funds on public goods. In addition, the increase in T clearly causes V
to rise and U to fall. This raises 7r'(V— V'1)/ir, resultingin more weight on the preferences
of the resident. The composition of public goods should therefore also improve.
2.3Extensions
The previous derivation ignored several potentially important complications. For one. we
initially assumed that public expenditures provided consumption benefits to residents. but
had no effect on firm productivity.20 In addition, our initial derivation assumed a linear
technology, implying that prices cannot be affected by the choice of public expenditures.
With a more general production function, in contrast, a change in government expenditures
affects the entire general equilibrium for the economy, and so can affect all prices.
How do our previous results change if public expenditures affect firm productivity and
equilibrium prices? If we rederive the first-order condition characterizing the choice of g. we
would now find that
.MRS+V_V71) (MRS D1+t3)xL) ]
'9Wjtha labor income tax rather than a consumption tax, however, a lump-sum tax would normally cause
an increase in tax revenue. Labor supply is sufficiently inelastic, however, that we presume the sum of the
first two terms remains negative.
20See Aschauer (1989) for evidence to the contrary.
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Comparing equations (11) and (15), we find two differences. First, the added term on the
left-hand side, —(1+tj)xj(dp/dg) ,measuresthe value of the productivity gain resulting
from the added infrastructure expenditures. As before, these benefits are given too little
weight in decision-making, everything else equal, when 7r'(V —V')/7r< 1. In addition, the
change in equilibrium prices implies additional changes in tax revenue. A distorting tax on
good jnowinduces more expenditures on gj to the extent that x(dp/dg) > 0 as well as
p3(dx/dg,) > 0.




Thevalue to the resident of the productivity gains from any infrastructure investments must
now be taken into account. As before, dx3 is the change in demand brought about. due to
the combined changes not only in tk, T, and g, but also in p.
To understand the implications of these added complications, consider the governments
decision regarding the level of an infrastructure investment g1 that raises productivity in
industry j.Asa result of added g2. output of industry jwillexpand until prices readjust to
make any further expansion unprofitable. If the economy is small and open, so that it is a
price taker in both the goods market and the capital market, then the only price that can
change is the wage rate. The wage rate will therefore rise, causing output in other sectors to
fall, and eventually leading to an end to the expansion of industry j.
Rowwould the tax structure best be designed to provide incentives to invest in g1? As
a result of the added gz, output x3 rises while output elsewhere falls. and the wage rate and
(presumably) labor supply rise. Capital investment in industry jrises,while investment in
other industries falls.21 Taxes onor capital (income) in industry j,subsidiesto output and
capital in other industries, and taxes on labor income can all help to raise the government's
incentive to produce gi.
The offsetting costs in each case arise from the excess burden expression E1tpdx
22
21Thenet change in capital investment is ambiguous, since it depends on the relative capital intensities of
production in the various industries.
22An additional potential cost is a drop in expenditures on other public goods.
15These costs can often be small. For example, if labor supply is totally inelastic, then a ,ta.x
on labor income induces more investment in g without creating any excess burden in the
process. The labor tax should increase until the utility gains from the added expenditures
on g are just offset by the utility loss from a change in expenditures on other public goods.
Even if the demand for x3 has a nontrivial price elasticity, however, the term dx3 reflects
as well the effects of changes in government expenditures. Consider the behavioral response
to an increase in some tax rate, t2, e.g. an increased tax rate on output in industry j,that
induces higher expenditures on those gj that cause an increase in x3. The direct effect of such
a tax increase would be a fall in the tax base x3, while the indirect effect through changing
g2 raises the tax base, resulting in a smaller net drop (or even a rise) in x. For example.
an increased tax rate on agricultural production in an isolated region can make it attractive
for the government to build better road access to this region. Even if the tax base still falls
on net, the efficiency cost of using distorting taxes may be much lower, given the feedback
effects arising from the change in government expenditures.
3 Discussion
Even if correct in principle, are these effects of the tax structure on government expenditures
important enough in practice to matter? This has yet to be shown.23 The objective of this
paper in part is to point out the value of empirical work examining the effects of the tax
structure on government as well as private behavior.
Should we really expect to see noticeable effects? If public expenditures simply provide
consumption benefits to residents, and if the utility function is separable between private
goods and public goods, e.g. takes the form U(C) + H(G) as is commonly assumed, then
C would seem to have no effect on observable behavior (except perhaps through changes in
equilibrium producer prices), implying that the tax structure cannot be used to affect the
choice of G.
Even in this case, however, distorting taxes can help improve incentives when people are
mobile across jurisdictions. Choices of C that raise the utility of residents will make the
jurisdiction a more attractive place to live. If the housing stock is fixed in the short term.
then property values would be bid up to reflect the utility gain to residents, suggesting that a
property tax is an effective incentive device. If the housing stock can easily adjust, then the
231n extreme cases, we feel that the evidence of taxes affecting government behavior seems transparent. See
Oi (1995) and Gordon (1990), for example, for a discussion of how the design of the local tax structure made
Chinese township and village governments strongly supportive of the entry and growth of new nonstate firms.
16number of residents would presumably expand, making a tax tied to the numer of people.
e.g. a labor income tax, attractive.24 A higher marginal tax rate on property values, or laor
income, offset perhaps by added exemptions to keep revenue unchanged, then provides more
high—powered incentives to government officials to provide additional public expenditures.
This gain in public incentives must be traded off with added distortions to private incentives.
There is a much stronger presumption for the use of distorting taxes to improve the
incentives government officials face to provide infrastructure investments. Activities that
benefit from infrastructure investments should expand in response, so that taxes on these
activities are effective in providing incentives to government officials. The more closely tied
the officials budget is to the benefits resulting from added public investment, the better
aligned the incentives.
The incentive effects of taxes on government behavior can easily become important when
the tax base is more narrow. Whenever some sectors are taxed at higher rates than other
sectors, government officials have an incentive to encourage a shift in resources from the less
heavily taxed to the more heavily taxed sectors. For example. in many developing countries
the existing income taxes apply mainly to large manufacturing firms. where income can be
most easily monitored. The government then faces an incentive to favor this highly taxed
sector. whether through tariff protection of these large firms or through red tape hindering
the activity of the rest of the economy. These distortions to government behavior push in the
opposite direction from the distortions to private behavior, with one causing the taxed sector
to expand and the other to contract, suggesting the possibility of smaller efficiency costs from
such narrow tax bases once the effects on government activity are taken into account.
Another important example of a narrow tax base is the use of Pigovian taxes to discourage
externality-generating activities. Pigovian taxes are in principle an effective means to restore
efficiency when some activities generate negative externalities. As Goulder, Parry & Burtraw
(1997) point out, Pigovian taxes should dominate direct regulation given that the resulting
revenue can be used to finance a reduction in other tax rates. These arguments assume.
however, that the government behaves optimally. When activities that generate negative
externalities are taxed, government officials have a perverse incentive to encourage more such
activity. If this perverse effect on government behavior is important enough. then regulations
may dominate Pigovian taxes.
Similarly, Polinsky & Shavell (1984) argued that fines dominate punishment as a deterrent
to crime. Both impose private costs on criminals. However, fines generate extra government
24S Glaeser (1996), Hoxby (forthcoming), and Wilson & Gordon (1998) for a closer examination of these
cases.
17revenue, whereas punishment can generate a loss in government revenue. Polinky & Shavell
(1984) ignore, however, the effects of fines vs. punishment on the behavior of governm'ent
officials. Government officials must decide how much effort to exert in identifying and prose-
cuting criminals. The use of fines rather than punishment encourages more effort, but perhaps
too much effort. In particular, not only will officials set up "speed traps," bt they can be
too quick to find someone guilty, in order to collect the fine. Facing such a strong incentive.
they can also credibly use the threat of an inappropriate guilty verdict to extort money from
innocent parties. If fines generate excessive enforcement incentives, then punishments may
be a preferable means of discouraging criminal activity.
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